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Abstract: Textbooks on financial management have emphasized the shortcomings
of the payback criterion for decades. However, empirical evidence suggests that in
actual capital budgeting procedures the payback method is used quite regularly.
Mostly, it is implemented supplementary to net present value or internal rate of
return, but small companies tend to rely on payback times as single criterion. A
convincing theoretical foundation for the observed use of the payback criterion is
lacking.
Consequently, our goal is to provide such an explanation for the payback cri-
terion’s popularity. We demonstrate from a decision theoretical perspective how
relying on payback times simplifies investment decisions in modern organizations.
Gathering information from different management levels and ensuring the utilization
of individual skills requires a multi-stage capital budgeting process. Accordingly, we
consider fundamental organizational features of this process with respect to their
impact on the payback method’s use.
For this purpose, we built upon almost stochastic dominance (ASD) as model-
ing device. Firstly, we show that applying this concept allows to include the risk
preferences of all relevant decision makers into the analysis. Secondly, we illustrate
that the criteria derived from this model help conveying these preferences to those
who do the preparatory work preceding the final decision. To some extent, these
new criteria are generalizations of payback times. This finding provides a potential
explanation for the payback’s persisting prominence.
Key Words: capital budgeting, decision procedures, investment appraisal, net
present value, payback method, almost stochastic dominance, risk aversion, uncer-
tainty
JEL classification: G31, D81, (D 70)
11 Introduction
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2005 the “[w]orldwide capital
expenditures by U.S. [multinational companies] totaled $ 478.1 billion; capital ex-
penditures in the United States by U.S. parents accounted for $ 340.8 billion ...
.”1 Nevertheless, investment activities’ relevancy does not merely result from the
volume of capital spent but from their impact on profitability as well. A recent mag-
azine article explains the unprecedented record earnings of Fortune 500 companies
in 2006 by “[t]he productivity improvement ... partially due to the capital expen-
diture boom of the ’90s.”2 Hence, capital budgeting decisions are among the most
important ones made by financial managers.3 Most companies, especially divisional-
ized ones, have installed centralized capital budgeting procedures to structure these
resource allocation decisions and to enforce company policies.4 Here, standardized
key figures are implemented to communicate comparable investment proposals over
all divisions supporting top-level management decisions.
Despite huge academic effort dedicated to developing theoretical concepts and
practical procedures for enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of capital budget-
ing decisions5, a considerable gap between theory and practice remains.6 Recent
studies confirm that –in contrast to recommendations from financial theory– the
payback criterion still enjoys great popularity among practitioners. For instance,
Graham/Harvey (2002) state that in their sample “... the payback period was the
most frequently used capital budgeting technique (...). This result is surprising in
the sense that financial textbooks have stressed the shortcomings of the payback cri-
terion for decades ...”7 In fact many companies use payback time supplementary to
net present value or internal rate of return.8 This kind of use seems to become even
more important over time.9 From a theoretical point of view the wide-spread appli-
1Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007, p. 1).
2Tully (2007).
3Cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 355), Klammer et al. (1991, p. 113).
4Cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 358), Ann et al. (1987, p. 112).
5In this sense Pinches (1982, p. 6) states: “Tremendous strides have been made by both the busi-
ness and academic communities in terms of our understanding and acceptance of capital budgeting
techniques.”
6Cf., e.g., Arnold/Hatzopoulos (2000, p. 622), O’Brien (1997, p. 173), Kim et al. (1986, p. 50).
7Graham/Harvey (2002, pp. 11).
8Cf. Lefley (1996, p. 208).
9Cf. Yard (2000, p. 155) who states: “[The payback method’s] use as a single criterion seems to
have decreased over time, ... [but] it is still commonly used as a secondary measure. In fact this
type of use seems to have increased.”
2cation of the payback method is remarkable. As a matter of fact, no consensus exists
which forces are driving this phenomenon. Some previous papers try to explain the
payback method’s popularity by interpreting it as a means of risk controlling or
liquidity planning. Further, some authors argue that the payback method’s simplic-
ity in combination with management’s lack of familiarity with more sophisticated
methods of investment appraisal results in the persistence of this rule of thumb.10
However, a convincing theoretical foundation for the observed use of the payback
criterion is still lacking.
Accordingly, our goal is to provide an explanation for the payback criterion’s
popularity. A major contribution of our approach is to recognize the importance
of fundamental organizational aspects, like delegation or hierarchical subordination,
for investment decision processes.11 This contrasts with previous theoretical con-
tributions attempting to justify the application of the payback criterion, because
they concentrate on a single decision maker.12 Hence, these papers do not capture
a key issue of modern capital budgeting procedures – the interaction of managers
from different hierarchy levels and professional backgrounds. Due to the complexity
of modern investment projects many real world capital budgeting decisions require
expertise from various different areas like, e.g., technology, engineering, sales, fi-
nance, and sociology. Moreover, preparatory tasks, like data gathering, preparing
proposals etc., are delegated within organizations. Thus, it is reasonable to as-
sume that investment decisions are subject to several personal views and depend
on the organizational context at hand. To secure consistency, in many companies
these multi-person multi-level capital budgeting procedures are governed by a for-
mal screening and review body, like an investment committee. Moreover, they are
structured by formal guidelines, schedules, and manuals intended to secure a broad
support for a successful investment project.13 In such an environment the use of
appraisal techniques acceptable for all relevant decision makers simplifies reaching
mutually agreed upon decisions. However, note that we do not search for an au-
tomatism identifying the best investment decision for a given data set, i.e., we are
not aiming at replacing the complete decision making process within the organiza-
tion by a black box. Rather, we are looking for a decision theoretical justification of
10Cf. Graham/Harvey (2002, p. 12), Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 355).
11E.g., Lefley (1996, p. 214) notes the role of the payback criterion in communication.
12Cf., e.g., Narayanan (1985, pp. 311), Mepham (1975, pp. 869), Gordon (1955, pp. 253).
13Cf. Arnold (2005, p. 171), Pike (1988, p. 343), Klammer et al. (1991, p. 128). See also the case
study in Ross (1986).
3the payback method as an instrument to ease decision making on risky investment
projects, accepting its application as key investment figure in practice.
We will demonstrate that the payback criterion may be a mutually acceptable
tool in the sense discussed above. By its implementation a multitude of personal
risk preferences can be represented in the investment process simplifying the co-
ordination of decision making.14 For modeling this representation problem we use
almost stochastic dominance (ASD) introduced by Leshno and Levy (2002). Firstly,
we show that this concept allows to include the risk preferences of the relevant
decision makers into the analysis. Secondly, it can be shown that conveying these
preferences to those who do the preparatory work preceding the final decision can
be achieved by means of ASD as well. This finding provides a potential explanation
for the payback’s persisting prominence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 an overview of
the empirical and theoretical literature focusing on the payback method is given. In
section 3, we consider fundamental organizational features of the capital budgeting
process in a stylized manner, i.e., we identify the impact of organizational aspects
on the importance of the payback criterion. In section 4 the modeling device of
almost stochastic dominance is introduced, the new investment appraisal criterion
(Leshno-Levy criterion) is derived, and its relation to earlier research on payback
times by, e.g., Gordon (1955) and Levy (1968) is clarified. The paper concludes
with a brief summary in section 5.
2 Literature review
From an academic perspective net present value (NPV) has been argued to be the
favorable capital appraisal technique over decades. Nevertheless, early studies dating
from the ’60s find the discounted cash-flow techniques –including NPV– to be the
least popular ones.15 Moreover, some of these studies identify the payback method
(PB) as the most popular appraisal technique, irrespective of its well-documented
shortcomings, like ignoring time value of money, ignoring cash flows beyond the
cutoff date, and setting the cut-off period arbitrarily. Even today the payback
14Similarly, Arnold (2005, p. 156): “There is an indication in the literature that [...] simpler
methods are used for purposes such as communicating project viability and gaining commitment
throughout an organisation.”
15For an overview of these early studies cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 357).
4method is still used quite regularly as many empirical studies show.16 These studies
have isolated a number of factors with explanatory power for the prominence of the
payback method. Besides capital budget size17 and the degree of shareholder-value
orientation18 the most prominent factors are:
• firm size: Empirical observations indicate that small companies tend to rely
more often on the payback method.19 However, as Lefley (1996, p. 208) points
out, the results are controversial.20
• CEO/CFO age and tenure respectively CEO/CFO level of education: The
younger a CEO/CFO and the higher his degree of education the more often
sophisticated appraisal techniques, like NPV or internal rate of return (IRR),
are used, meaning the relative importance of PB decreases.21
• firms’ capital constraints: Pike (1983, pp. 666 and 669) claims that the payback-
criterion is used more often, and profitability measures less often, the more
restricted financial resources are. However, neither Brounen et al. (2004, p.
8) nor Graham/Harvey (2002, p. 12) can confirm this hypothesis.
• nationality: European companies are more hesitant to apply discounted cash
flow techniques than American ones.22 For Asian companies the payback
method even dominates in terms of application frequency and importance.23
Although nationality has an influence on payback method’s application frequency
its use is nevertheless a world-wide phenomenon, see the international overview
provided in Horngren et al. (2006), which is extended and up-dated in Table 1.24
Here the application frequencies of the most popular techniques are listed by country:
16For an overview of such empirical studies from 1970 to 1995, cf. Lefley (1996, pp. 217).
17Cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, pp. 359).
18Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 8).
19Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 8), Graham/Harvey (2002, p. 12), Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 361).
20Cf. Arnold/Hatzopoulos (2000, p. 605), Block (1997, p. 289), Sangster (1993, p. 318) as well.
21Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 8), Graham/Harvey (2002, p. 12).
22Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 5).
23Cf. Ann et al. (1987, pp. 116). Hermes et al. (2005, p. 7) argue that a host country’s stage
of economic development should influence the companies’ capital budgeting. However, regarding
payback method they cannot confirm this claim given their sample of Dutch and Chinese firms.
24Cf. Horngren et al. (2006, p. 735). The column-wise accumulated percentages add up to more
than 100%, meaning that companies regularly apply two or more methods simultaneously.
5USA25 AUS CDN GER26 IRE27 JPN RSA28 SCO UK29
NPV30 75% 45% 41% 48% 6% 17% 48% 80(97)%
IRR 76% 37% 62% 42%
84%
4% 32% 58% 81(84)%
PB31 57% 61% 50% 50% 84% 52% 17% 78% 70(66)%
Table 1: International comparison of capital budgeting methods
The prominence of the payback method is confirmed in other studies as well, like,
e.g., in a recent survey on European companies.32 The same holds true for Asian
companies. In Malaysia the payback criterion dominates, in Hong Kong and Singa-
pore the accounting rate of return is similarly popular.33
Despite differences in sample sizes, firm sizes and considered industries, Table 1
provides a general empirical insight. Obviously, profitability measures, like NPV
and IRR, and the payback criterion are used side by side. However, according to
Pike (1996, p. 83) only NPV and IRR are used as substitutes indicating that the
payback method is not regarded as a simple rule of thumb replacing more sophisti-
cated profitability measures.34 Thus, the payback method’s persistence cannot be
explained satisfactorily by its simplicity in combination with lack of familiarity with
more sophisticated methods. Further, if this argumentation were true, with the
improvement of CEOs’ and CFOs’ education the gap between theory and practice
should narrow, i.e., the use of the payback method should vanish. But, longitudinal
UK data do not support this assumption. Table 2 shows that the prominence of the
payback method has not been decreasing over time.35
25Cf. Graham/Harvey (1999, p. 27).
26Cf. DeBrounen et al. (2004, p. 7).
27Cf. also O’Brien (1997, pp. 180) for the widespread use of the payback criterion in Ireland.
28Cf. Hall (2000, p. 361). Note that the data refer to the most important method to be used.
29Cf. Arnold/Hatzopoulos (2000, p. 605). In brackets are given the data for the 100 largest
companies included in the Times 1000.
30Remember the abbreviations for Net-Present-Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR),
and payback time (PB).
31Percentages refer to the use of both variants of the pay-back-method –static and discounted
version.
32The study by Brounen et al. (2004) reproducing the set-up used by Graham/Harvey (2001) is
presented in Table 8 in appendix A.
33Cf. Ann et al. (1987, pp. 116).
34In contrast, Arnold/Hatzopoulos (2000, p. 608) find that NPV and IRR gain at the expense
of the payback method to a minor extent.
35Similar overviews for the USA –given in appendix A as Table 9– confirm the observation
extracted from the UK data.
6Pike (1996), data for Sangster Lefley Arnold/Hatzo-
1975 1980 1986 1992 (1993) (1994) poulos (2000)
NPV 32% 39% 68% 74% 48% 52% 80%
IRR 44% 57% 75% 81% 58% 55% 81%
PB 73% 81% 92% 94% 78% 94% 70%
Table 2: Capital budgeting in the UK
Obviously, the payback method’s relative importance has decreased, because of the
discounted cash flow techniques’ growing prominence.36 However, total application
of the payback method has increased from 73% in 1975 to 94% in 1992. The more
recent studies starting in 1993 confirm the observation that the payback method
is applied for virtually all investment appraisals. But note that these studies only
account for the application frequency and not for the methods’ importance.37 With
the increasing prevalence of discounted cash-flow techniques, the payback method
has become less important. Nowadays it is typically used as a secondary criterion
or as a constraint.38 An example for the use as a constraint is given when a required
payback period –subjectively determined based on past experiences and project risk
estimations– is used in the sense of a hurdle-rate. An example for the use as a
secondary criterion is given, when projects of the same profitability are ranked by
their pay-off period. While PB as a secondary criterion allows for an additional fine-
tuning in the projects’ ranking, the application as a constraint sorts out projects
independent of their profitability.
Early analytical papers try to justify the payback criterion as a proxy for prof-
itability. Gordon (1955, pp. 253) shows that the reciprocal of the payback period
can be interpreted as an estimation of the IRR. His analysis has been extended by
Levy (1968 and 1971) and Sarnat/Levy (1969). Mepham (1975, p. 869) points out
that selecting investment projects from a whole bundle of alternatives according
to the NPV rule and according to the PB method results in comparable selection
decisions. However, this finding suffers from the restrictive assumption of constant
cash-inflows. Further, simulations have been run, in order to test how the PB
36Cf. Pike (1988, p. 347).
37The difference between use and importance is elaborated in Lefley (1996, p. 208). He finds
that use of PB is positively and importance of PB is inversely related to firms’ capital budget size.
38Pike (1983) finds that 90% of firms implementing multiple methods use PB. Similarly, Shields
et al. (1991) suggest that U.S. companies maximize net present value or rates of return subject to
payback constraints.
7method performs in identifying promising projects compared to more sophisticated
techniques.39
With rise of the agency paradigm, the application of the PB method has been ex-
plained by incentive effects due to institutional properties. For instance, Narayanan
(1985) concludes that a manager benefits from applying the payback method to
investment selection problems. By choosing projects with early cash-inflows he im-
proves the expectation about his skills and hence the present value of his remuner-
ation.40 A similar principal-agent conflict is analyzed by Thakor (1990). Here the
payback method is used as a means of harmonizing the goals of actual shareholders
and future investors.
Moreover, payback times are considered as a means of accounting for liquidity
constraints. Weingartner (1969) states that the application of the PB method selects
projects with high cash flows in the early periods of the useful life. In this sense the
PB method minimizes the risk of foregoing other investment projects due to lack of
capital, i.e., PB increases the probability of being able to invest in unforeseen future
investment alternatives. This means, payback times account for the management’s
restricted forecasting ability.41 Wambach (2000) analysis a situation, where the
investment outlay instead of future cash-inflows is uncertain. Based on a real-option
approach the payback period is used as an indicator for the optimal time instance
for investment activities given required capital outlays decrease over time.42
Our approach combines three dimensions of the literature reviewed above. Firstly,
we concentrate on riskiness of investment projects, like Weingartner (1969) or Wam-
bach (2000). Secondly, we incorporate into our model important organizational fea-
tures of typical capital budgeting processes, extending the view of agency theory.
Thirdly, we shall find that the central appraisal criterion deduced following our ap-
proach may be seen as a generalization of the contributions by Gordon (1955) and
Levy (1968). Interestingly, the evidence provided in Table 1 is consistent with our
risk-controlling justification of the payback method: Interpret NPV and IRR as
profitability measures and PB as a risk figure. Then, a simple explanation for the
simultaneous use of NPV or IRR on the one hand and PB on the other hand is
39Cf., e.g., Hertz (1968).
40Similar arguments can be found in Pike (1985, p. 50) and Chen/Clark (1994, p. 123). For an
overview of papers dealing with incentive effects caused by reputational concerns, see Hirshleifer
(1993, pp. 148).
41Cf. Lefley (1996, p. 209).
42Cf. Wambach (2000, pp. 253)
8that investments are evaluated in a fashion similar to the μ−σ–principle frequently
applied in financial theory.
3 Organizational embedding of capital budgeting
procedures
Since technological knowledge, administrative skills as well as product- and customer-
related information are distributed among many individuals, capital budgeting in
modern corporations is a multi-person process. The spectrum of decision making
bodies in organizations ranges from a single decision maker over a group of decision
makers originating from different management levels interacting to find a consen-
sus, like, e.g., in investment committees, to a group of peers in charge of the final
investment decision, like executive boards. For categorizing different organizational
forms of capital budgeting processes and their impact on the payback method’s role
distinctive characteristics have to be identified. We focus on the degree of delegation
of decision competences, the size of the decision making body and communication
needs resulting from preparatory work preceding the final decision making. Here,
on the one hand we consider the degree of delegation as a continuous attribute, be-
cause, e.g., the preparation of an investment proposal typically includes eliminating
unfavorable alternatives, meaning decision competences are (partially) exerted at
this stage. On the other hand the decision making body may consist of a single
individual or a multitude of decision makers. In the latter case the final decision
may be a consensual process, where preferences have to be communicated among
the decision makers in order to moderate a compromise. Alternatively, the final
multi-person decision may be subject to a voting procedure, where majorities have
to be organized by co-ordinating preferences. This is reflected in Table 3, depicting
four stylized investment process scenarios, by the degree of co-ordination:
degree of coordination
degree of delegation low high
low entrepreneurial decision board decision
high process representative’s decision investment committee decision
Table 3: Different investment decision scenarios
The characteristic of communication needs is not exhibited explicitly in Table 3 as
9they may occur in each setting depending on the delegation of preparatory tasks.
Note however that since we focus on investment projects with uncertain future cash
flows, communication means primarily conveying risk preferences.
For the four scenarios different justifications for the payback method may hold true:
• In the entrepreneurial decision scenario only one decision maker exists. Thus,
no problem of coordinating different decision makers arises. Further, as no in-
vestment competences are delegated no communication of requirements occurs.
However, key figures describing investment projects will be needed for com-
munication, if data are collected by other individuals on a preparatory stage.
This scenario describes small family-owned companies or start-ups where, e.g.,
engineers develop and market a product from an invention without a strong
background in business knowledge. Here, the use of the payback method might
be explained by the knowledge hypothesis, i.e., the payback method is used
because of its simplicity.
• The scenario ‘representative’s decision’ is very similar to the entrepreneurial
one. However, companies are slightly bigger, so that the generation of ideas
for investment projects and the subsequent appraisal and selection process
are (partly) delegated. Minimum requirements, e.g., profitability hurdle rates,
are communicated via key figures serving as appraisal criteria. Due to the
existence of a hierarchically superior decision maker the representative needs
to justify his decision according to these key figures. This implies that a
critical payback time may result from the entrepreneur’s individual preferences
or experiences. Hence, the payback method is a rule of thumb rather than a
theoretically based criterion.
• The scenario ‘board decision’ indicates that top-level decision makers decide
upon the investment projects to be funded. Because data gathering is del-
egated and pieces of information are aggregated in a proposal, an unbiased
communication via key indicators is required. Further, the decision process
needs co-ordination, because, e.g., power can be distributed asymmetrically
among board members. Therefore, inter-subjectively reliable measures are
needed to make a compromise or to find a majority on the board. In this case,
PB might be used as a secondary criterion.
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• An ‘investment committee’ bundles the investment competences for the whole
firm relieving top level management. It is formed by members of various skills
from different departments, like technicians, accountants, and engineers. They
have to communicate subjective assessments and predictions in such a manner
that they can be reproduced and understood by third parties. Further, due
to uncertainty of cash flows an inter-subjective definition of acceptable risk
has to be found. Here, the payback method typically serves as a constraint,
i.e., as a tool for communicating the decision maker’s risk preferences to the
applicant or the management accountant.
Identifying the need for a certain investment, the search for corresponding invest-
ment alternatives, and the preparation of the investment proposal typically belong to
the competences of the operating divisions (decentralized phase). However, depend-
ing on the required capital expenditure, the authority for the final project selection
is delegated to a centralized committee (centralized phase).43 We will consider the
interface between the decentralized and the centralized phase of the budgeting pro-
cess, because this is a crucial point in both the ‘board decision’ and the ‘investment
committee proposal’ scenario. Note however, the budgeting process should not be
thought of as a linear one. Especially, the preparation of the proposals will typically
include repeated discussion of preliminary versions, modifications of the project,
and re-estimation of cash flows. This may explain empirical evidence indicating
that companies consider project definition and cash flow estimation the most diffi-
cult steps of the capital budgeting process.44 Moreover, management accountants
discussing the project with applicants have an important pre-decision function. If
they qualify proposals as unsatisfactory, these proposals will barely be presented to
the investment committee or the board. This is consistent to the very high approval
rates observable for those projects finally presented to the decision instances.45
43For a formal description cf. Taggart (1987, pp. 179).
44Cf. Scott/Petty (1984, p. 113).
45Cf. Arnold (2005, p. 171).
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4 A criterion for investment appraisal based on al-
most stochastic dominance
4.1 The general idea of applying almost stochastic dominance
to organizationally embedded investment choices
In this section we will briefly introduce the concept of almost stochastic dominance.
We will demonstrate that it becomes possible by this concept to include the prefer-
ences of all relevant decision makers into the analysis. Note that this is a necessary
step in modelling capital budgeting processes for organizational settings represented
by the ‘board decision’ or the ‘investment committee proposal’. Moreover, we em-
phasize that ASD allows conveying the decision makers’ risk preferences to subor-
dinates responsible for the early and intermediate stages of the capital budgeting
process.
We focus on the choice between a risk-free investment in bonds and a real in-
vestment alternative with uncertain future cash flows, henceforth referred to as the
risky investment project. Let the risky investment project be represented by the
sequence of uncertain net cash flows, Ct, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T , where T is the last period
of the project’s useful life. Assume the initial capital outlay, C0 ∈ R, to be given and
certain, whereas the subsequent periods’ net cash flows, Ct, are random variables.
The risk-free investment is characterized by the certain initial capital outlay cF0 and
the risk-free interest rate, i ≥ 0. This defines its cash flows in the subsequent periods
to be cFt = icF0 , t = 1, 2, ..., T F − 1 and cFTF = (1 + i)cF0 , with T F being the bonds’
maturity period. Assume that both investment opportunities require the same ini-
tial capital outlay, C0 = cF0 , and are finished in the same period, i.e., T = T F . Due
to the cash flows’ uncertainty the NPV of the risky alternative is a random variable,
V . In the following, we will assume a positive expected value of the random NPV,
E(V ) > 0. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the two
alternatives’ NPVs.
The CDF of the risky investment project’s NPV, G(·), is assumed to be continuous
on its finite support [v, v], v < 0 < v. As we will consider its risk explicitly, the
NPV is calculated by discounting with the interest rate of the risk-free alternative.
The same procedure applied to the risk-free alternative yields a stepwise CDF, H(·),
which assigns probability one to an NPV of zero, see Figure 1.
Given an organizational setting discussed in section 3, the choice between the
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Figure 1: The non-applicability of first order stochastic dominance
risky and the risk-free investment project requires taking into account the risk pref-
erences of a multitude of involved agents. From a decision theoretical perspective,
stochastic dominance is an appropriate device for this purpose. Its main idea is sum-
marized as follows: If a risky alternative A, described by its wealth consequences,
dominates an alternative B in terms of first order stochastic dominance, A is pre-
ferred to B by every rational and non-satiable decision maker. These decision makers
are represented by non-decreasing differentiable real-valued utility function.46 Let
U denote the set of these utility functions. Typically, U would include the subset
of decision makers relevant for the investment decision process in the sense dis-
cussed in section 3 or more precisely the corresponding utility functions. Hence, if
the risky investment stochastically dominates the risk-free one, all relevant decision
makers, as a group representing the firm, prefer the risky alternative. Moreover, an
agent preparing the corresponding investment proposal would know they do so, if
he discerns the dominance relation. Thus, generating projects which are likely to be
accepted in the capital budgeting process becomes possible.
Note that stochastic dominance remains a reasonable decision criterion even if
some of the axioms of expected utility theory do not apply. In this sense stochastic
dominance is robust under variations of the rationality concept, making it even
more attractive for practical application.47 But a look at Figure 1 reveals that
first order stochastic dominance is not applicable to the comparison of the two
investment projects under consideration. The reason is that G(·), representing the
risky investment project, assigns positive probability to wealth reductions as well as
to wealth increases. Therefore, the requirement for first order stochastic dominance
to hold, i.e., no intersection of the two CDFs, is violated. In Figure 1, the hatched
46Cf., e.g., Levy (1992, p. 557).
47Cf. Levy (1992, p. 560) for a discussion of this aspect.
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area indicates the difference between the two CDFs in the region of violation which is
restricted to the negative part of the CDF’s support. However, recently Leshno/Levy
(2002) proposed almost stochastic dominance (ASD), a modified version of stochastic
dominance that alleviates this problem.
ASD differs from first order stochastic dominance in the way of handling the
violation indicated above. For first order stochastic dominance the existence of such
a violation means it is not applicable. In contrast, ASD measures the risky invest-
ment project’s degree of violation by a parameter εG. This parameter represents
the cumulated difference between the two CDFs in the region of violation (e.g., the
size of the hatched area in Figure 1) relative to their cumulated difference over the
entire support (e.g., the size of the hatched plus the dotted area in Figure 1). In
a second step, under ASD the set of utility functions is reduced, starting from the
set U of all rational and non-satiable utility functions with u′(x) > 0 for all x. The
process of reducing U is controlled by a second parameter, ε.48 The set of utility
functions remaining after the reduction, U(ε), represents all those decision makers
who, despite the violation of first order stochastic dominance, prefer alternative G(·)
to H(·), given the degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement is bounded
by ε. Note that U(ε) ⊂ U because some decision makers in U will not tolerate the
violation and will thus be eliminated from U . In an application to the capital bud-
geting procedure, the remaining set U(ε) obviously should contain the set of the
relevant decision makers’ utility functions as a subset.
Finally, the risky investment, or its CDF G(·), is said to dominate the risk-free
investment, or CDF H(·), by ε-almost stochastic dominance (ε-ASD), if and only if
εG ≤ ε. More formally denoted, εG ≤ ε ⇔ G(·) ε H(·).
To explain the idea in greater detail, we describe mathematically the degree of
violation of the non-intersection requirement and have a closer look at the process
of reducing the set of decision makers.
The degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement, εG
Firstly, in general the size of the hatched area in Figure 1 is given by
∫ 0
v
G(v)−H(v)dv = E(V −) (1)
48Note that the distinction between ε and εP does not occur in Leshno/Levy (2002), but is
introduced here for ease of presentation.
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while the size of the dotted region may be written as
∫ v
0
H(v)−G(v)dv = E(V +) (2)
where V − = −min{V, 0} is the negative part and V + = max{V, 0} is the positive
part of the net present value, V . Both of these random variables are almost surely
non-negative. Hence, their respective expected values E(V −) and E(V +) are non-
negative and given by the areas indicated in Figure 1.
Following the ideas of Leshno/Levy (2002), parameter εG measuring the invest-
ment project’s degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement is therefore
given by 49
εG =
E(V −)
E(V +) + E(V −)
=
1
1 + E(V
+)
E(V −)
(3)
where E(V
+)
E(V −) > 1.
50 E(V −) is the expected value of random variable |V | conditional
on V ≤ 0. Hence, it measures the risk of a potential loss in wealth caused by the risky
investment project. Similarly, E(V +) measures the chance of earning a potential
profit. Therefore, (3) can be interpreted as a chance-risk-relationship.
ε-almost stochastic dominance
Secondly, we return to the idea of eliminating from U utility functions u(·), where
the magnitude of the reduction is controlled by a predetermined (maximal) degree of
violation of first order stochastic dominance, ε. ASD was proposed by Leshno/Levy
(2002) for cumulative distribution functions with finite support, [x, x]. Restrict
U to twice differentiable functions and the subset U(ε) ⊂ U remaining after the
elimination process is given by
U(ε) =
{
u ∈ U : u′(x) ≤
[
1
ε
− 1
]
min {u′(z) : z ∈ [x, x]} , x ∈ [x, x]
}
(4)
For utility functions on R exhibiting risk aversion, i.e., u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0 for all
x ∈ [x, x], the defining inequality in (4) can be reformulated to
u′(x) ≤
[
1
ε
− 1
]
u′(x) (5)
Hence, utility functions excluded from U(ε) “... assign a relatively high marginal
49Cf. Leshno/Levy (2002, p. 1080), formula (5).
50Note that E(V +) > E(V −) > 0 follows from reasons given on page 19.
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utility to very low values or a relatively low marginal utility to large values of x”.51
Note that U(ε) contains utility functions of different types, like risk-averse, risk-
neutral or S-shaped.
Example: To give a simple example, consider the family of exponential utility
functions ue(x) = 1−exp{−rx}, where r > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk aversion. If we restrict the analysis to this family, condition (5) reads
u′e(x) ≤
[
1
ε
− 1
]
u′e(x)
⇒ r exp{−rx} ≤
[
1
ε
− 1
]
r exp{−rx}
⇔ r ≤ ln(
1
ε
− 1)
(x− x) =: r(ε) (6)
For predetermined ε > 0 all decision makers with an exponential utility function
remain in U(ε) as long as their degree of absolute risk aversion does not exceed
the upper bound, r(ε), determined by (6), i.e., as long as r ≤ r(ε) holds. Hence,
for exponential utility functions, the (maximally admissible) degree of absolute risk
aversion, r(·), is a function of parameter ε.52 The derivative of r(·) is
dr(ε)
dε
= − 1
(x− x)(ε− ε2) < 0 (7)
This negative relationship shows that for the family of exponential utility functions
an increasing ε implies a decreasing critical risk aversion. Consequently, for a grow-
ing (maximal) degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement, ε, decision
makers with an ever smaller risk aversion have to be eliminated from U , i.e., the
greater ε, the smaller U(ε).53 Actually, Leshno/Levy (2002, p. 1079) show that if
ε → 1/2 , U(ε) eventually contains linear utility functions only.
For a predetermined ε Leshno/Levy (2002) proof in their Theorem 1 that if a
risky project’s degree of violation of first order stochastic dominance does not exceed
ε, i.e., εG ≤ ε, all decision makers represented by U(ε) prefer the risky to the risk-
51Cf. Leshno/Levy (2002, p. 1079).
52Note that the effect of ε can be observed so nicely, because exponential utility functions have
a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
53Since in a decision process the set of decision makers is given, the admissible risk might be
adjusted to achieve a majority, see table 4.
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free investment project. More precisely, G(·) dominates H(·) by ε-ASD if and only
if all decision makers in U(ε) prefer G(·) to H(·).
Accounting for the organization of capital budgeting when choosing the set U(ε∗)
Up to this point, the (maximal) degree of violation, ε, for the definition of U(ε)
was chosen arbitrarily. Next we look at the fixed and given set D ⊂ U of utility
functions representing non-risk seeking decision makers being relevant for the capital
budgeting process according to the organizational environment described in section
3. To avoid the case of pure risk neutrality assume that at least one decision maker
in D is not risk neutral. Let ε∗, 0 < ε∗ < 0.5, be the largest degree of violation
the decision makers in D accept in terms of almost stochastic dominance.54 Hence,
the utility functions of all relevant decision makers are included in the set U(ε∗),
D ⊂ U(ε∗) ⊂ U . The set U(ε∗) of utility functions, thus, serves as a simple model
of the firm’s decision making structure. For example, if the decision has to be made
by a board of directors or an investment committee in a consensual manner, every
member of this group should be represented by U(ε∗). Under these circumstances the
risky project is preferred to the risk-free investment by all relevant decision makers
if εG ≤ ε∗. This means, it is almost stochastic dominant at level ε∗ (ε∗-ASD), if
εG ≤ ε∗ ⇔ G(·) ε∗ H(·).
Example: Assume the investment committee consists of seven members, j =
1, ..., 7, with exponential utility functions uj(x) = 1 − exp{−jx}.55 The commit-
tee might in general decide based on the consensus principle or on majority voting.
Suppose the individual voting behaviour exclusively depends on the member’s risk
assessment of a project. Thus, the appropriate ε∗ depends on the voting scheme
–e.g. unanimity, qualified majority (for instance 75 % or 2
3
), or simple majority–
and on the risk preferences of the single decision makers. The pivotal committee
member, i.e., the one whose approval ensures the required majority, is indicated by
j∗. Assume x− x = 0.1. In this simple example the ε∗ values in Table 4 apply:
Having stated the advantages of almost stochastic dominance, some theoretical con-
siderations shall identify problems to be coped with when implementing ASD in real
budgeting procedures:
54See Appendix B for a formal definition of this value.
55In this example, all decision makers are risk averse so that an application of Almost Stochastic
Second Order Dominance (ASSD) becomes possible, see Leshno/Levy (2002, p. 1080). Since we
intend to include non-risk-averse decision making behaviour, too, we for the sake of generality
apply Almost Stochastic First Order Dominance (ASD).
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majority rule j∗ = rj∗ ε∗ D
unanimity 7 0.332 u1, u2, ..., u7
three-quarter majority 6 0.354 u1, u2, ..., u6
two-thirds majority 5 0.378 u1, u2, ..., u5
simple majority 4 0.401 u1, u2, ..., u4
Table 4: ε∗ depending on majority rule and committee members’ preferences
Technically, almost stochastic dominance of a risky project over the risk free
alternative means that all relevant decision makers in D prefer G(·) over H(·). Since
D is a proper subset of U(ε∗) this is not a necessary condition for an unanimous
preference.56 Cases might exist, where a project’s εG exceeds ε∗, although on an
individual level for all decision makers in D the expected utility for the risky project
calculated according to their individual utility function exceeds the expected utility
for the risk free alternative. This means, the risky project is mistakenly rejected.
Nevertheless, in our view this drawback is balanced by the ease of communicating
risk preferences via the parameter ε∗. Note that the opposite mistake, accepting
mistakenly a too risky project, is impossible under almost stochastic dominance.
Thus, in a multi-person context almost stochastic dominance is a cautious heuristic
aggregating individual risk preferences.
Moreover, the relationship between the support [x, x], used for the definition of
U(ε∗) in (4), and the support of the random NPV’s probability distribution [v, v]
warrants a discussion, because ε∗ might vary depending on delegation. To ease the
discussion, ε∗ is replaced by ε∗x, given [x, x] is the support used in the definition of
U(ε∗) and by ε∗v, given [v, v] is the support of the NPV’s probability distribution in
the following.
The literature indicates that investment competences are delegated to different
hierarchy levels depending on project size. For example, Table 5 shows the distri-
bution of critical expenditures requiring formal capital budgeting analysis for the
companies included in Fortune 1000.57
Consider a large project to be authorized by a board level committee, i.e., a
situation corresponding to the ‘board decision’ scenario in section 3. In this case we
may assume [x, x] = [v, v], meaning that the project is accepted or rejected based
56Cf. Leshno/Levy (2002, p. 1080, Theorem 1).
57Cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 358). See also Ferreira/Brooks (1988, p. 23) and Arnold (2005, p.
171). However, note budgeting systems again may vary according to cultural backgrounds, cf.,
e.g., Bailes/Assada (1991, pp. 133).
18
< 10.000$ 10.000− 99.999$ 100.000− 500.000$ > 500.000$ n. def.
21.2% 27.3% 31.8% 19.2% 0.5%
Table 5: Critical capital expenditures for Fortune 1000 companies
exclusively on its own characteristics. Accordingly, the parameter ε∗v depends on the
project specific bounds v and v. Thus, ε∗v can be used to generate a cut-off payback
period or a cut-off IRR as described in the following. Its value properly represents
the committee’s attitudes toward the risky project.
For small investment projects completely authorized by a lower management
level this statement may not hold true. Here, the interval [x, x] may serve to define
‘small projects’ by the condition [v, v] ⊂ [x, x]. In this case parameter ε∗x is again
determined for those decision makers responsible at the board level, according to the
interval [x, x]. Cut-off values deduced from ε∗x may be imposed on all small projects
to restrict the discretion of lower-level management. Accordingly, a controlled del-
egation of decision competences, like in the ‘investment committee’ scenario pre-
sented in section 3, becomes possible. However, a small project although rejected
by the lower-level decision-makers, might have been authorized by the board, had
the board considered it based on its individual interval [v, v]. This is due to the fact
that ε∗x ≤ ε∗v for x < v < v < x.58 As a consequence it may be reasonable to advice
the investment committee respectively the representative to submit projects to the
top hierarchy level for a final decision, given any doubts remain.
4.2 The Leshno-Levy criterion as a tool for the appraisal of
risky investment projects
For a thorough analysis of risky investment projects the time structure of cash flows
has to be considered. Therefore, let the risky investment project be defined by the
sequence of net cash flows, Ct, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T , as defined at the beginning of this
section. Assume the initial capital outlay, C0 ∈ R, to be given and certain, whereas
the subsequent periods’ net cash flows Ct are non-degenerated random variables
with probability distribution on the finite interval [ct, ct]. Moreover, the risk-free
investment is characterized by the certain initial capital outlay cF0 and the risk-free
interest rate, i ≥ 0. With this notation, the random NPV, V , of the risky investment
58See Appendix B for a comprehensive mathematical analysis.
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is calculated by applying the discount factor, q = 1 + i, to the cash flows
V =
T∑
τ=0
q−τCτ (8)
The CDF of random variable V , G(·), lives on the finite support [LB,UB] (see Figure
2). The lower bound, LB, of the NPV is given by LB = C0 + q−1c1 + ... + q−T cT ,
while the upper bound is UB = C0 + q−1c1 + ... + q−T cT . In the following, we will
assume a positive expected value of the random NPV, E(V ) > 0. The reasons for
this assumption are that, firstly, the NPV criterion applied to deterministic capital
budgeting situations excludes projects with non-positive NPV as disadvantageous.
Secondly, Leshno/Levy (2002, Proposition 2) show that a necessary condition for
one alternative dominating the other one in terms of ASD is that the mean of the
CDF representing the dominating alternative is strictly larger than the mean of the
dominated one. By definition, the mean of the risk-free alternative’s NPV is zero.
Therefore, E(V ) > 0, i.e., the classical textbook profitability criterion, is a necessary
condition for ASD to hold for a risky investment project.
Figure 2: ASD of risky investment project’s NPV
Similar to Figure 1, E(V −) and E(V +) are depicted by the hatched and the dot-
ted areas in Figure 2, respectively. For E(V −) = 0 the risky investment project
dominates the risk-free investment in the sense of (simple) first order stochastic
dominance. However, E(V −) symbolizes the expected loss in wealth due to choos-
ing the risky instead of the risk-free project. If this expected loss was zero, the
probability of a negative NPV, P (V < 0), would vanish, too. To exclude such
trivial situations with no economic risk, we assume E(V −) > 0, and consequently
LB < 0. As we have already seen, for this situation first order stochastic dominance
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does not apply.
The expected value of any random variable may be written as59
E(V ) = E(V +)− E(V −) (9)
Consequently, a positive expected NPV, E(V ) > 0, means that the degree of vi-
olation of the non-intersection requirement by the risky investment project, i.e.,
parameter εG as defined by (3)
εG =
E(V −)
E(V +) + E(V −)
,
is restricted to 0 < εG < 12 .
60 Moreover, by use of (9) we may replace (3) by
εG =
E(V −)
E(V ) + 2E(V −)
(10)
Because of E(V −) > 0, (10) can be rearranged to the final version of the degree of
violation of first order stochastic dominance of the risky investment project
εG =
1
2 + E(V )
E(V −)
=
1
2 + 1
E(V +)
E(V )
−1
(11)
where E(V
+)
E(V )
> 1. In addition, we choose control parameter ε∗ so that the utility
functions of all relevant decision makers are included in U(ε∗), i.e., D ⊂ U(ε∗). Then
the risky project dominates the risk-free one in terms of ASD at level ε∗, if and only
if εG ≤ ε∗, or
1
ε∗
− 2 ≤ 1
E(V +)
E(V )
− 1
(12)
In other words, ε∗-ASD of the risky project, i.e., G(·) ε∗ H(·), is equivalent to the
following criterion.
Proposition 1 Let the expected NPV, E(V ), and the expected loss in wealth, E(V −),
be strictly positive. Then
E(V −) ≤
[
1
1
ε∗ − 2
]
E(V )⇔ G(·) ε∗ H(·). (13)
59Cf. Wolff (1989, p. 19)
60As is required by Leshno/Levy (2002).
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Compared to the risk-free alternative, a risky investment project thus is attractive
to the decision makers, represented by the set of utility functions D ⊂ U(ε∗), if
its expected loss in wealth is bounded by a multiple of the expected net present
value. This multiple γ(ε∗) = 11
ε∗−2
exclusively depends on the attitude toward risk
commonly agreed upon by all relevant decision makers.61 Obviously, for risk-neutral
decision makers, i.e., ε∗ → 1
2
, the restriction on the right hand side is rather weak,
whereas it becomes tight for strongly risk-averse decision makers. For ε∗ → 0, the
right hand side of (13) approaches zero. Henceforth, we refer to the inequality in (13)
as the Leshno-Levy criterion. It is well known that E(V −) = P (V ≤ 0)E(−V |V ≤
0), see Ogryczak/Ruszczynski (1999). By using this expression the Leshno-Levy
criterion becomes
P (V ≤ 0)E(−V |V ≤ 0) ≤ γ(ε∗)E(V ) (14)
Note that we did not assume stochastically independent net cash flows. Typically,
one would expect sales volume, prices of materials, or labor etc. and hence cor-
responding cash flows of subsequent periods to be correlated. Under such circum-
stances the most advisable approach for evaluating the distribution of the cash flows
and, hence, the NPV in practical terms is Monte-Carlo simulation.
Example: Suppose that for a risky investment project the initial capital outlay is
50.000 $ and each of its random cash flows, Ct, t = 1, 2, ..., 5, follows a triangular
distribution with parameters minimal value, αmin, modus, αmod, and maximal value,
αmax. Let the interest rate be i = 0.1. In table 6 numerical values are given for
these parameters, where αmin = αmod/3 and αmax = 1.5αmod. The calculated lower
bounds and expected values of the NPV as defined in (8) for successive conceivable
lengths of the investment project’s useful life are given in columns six and seven of
table 6. Column eight displays the corresponding values for the upper bound on the
expected loss in wealth. We assume that the utility functions of all relevant decision
makers are included in U(0.001). In this case, γ(0.001) = 0, 001002004.
61Recently, the finance literature discussed the Expected Shortfall as a risk measure to replace
the criticized Value-at-Risk. Denote again by G(0) = P (V < 0) the probability of a negative
NPV V . If both sides of the inequality in (13) are divided by this probability, the left-hand side
reads E(V −)/G(0). This is the Expected Shortfall at confidence level G(0), see Acerbi/Tasche
(2002). Thus, the Proposition says that the risky investment project is ε∗-ASD, if and only if its
Expected Shortfall at confidence level G(0) is bounded by γ(ε∗)E(V )G(0) . The Expected Shortfall may
be rewritten in terms of a mean-risk model with the weighted mean deviation from quantile as the
risk measure, see, e.g., Choi/Ruszczynski (2008). Hence the above interpretation of (13) holds for
the mean-risk model as well.
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The last column of table 6 shows the values for the expected loss resulting from a
Monte-Carlo simulation with 10.000 iterations. Here we assume that the correlation
of any pair of successive random cash flows, (Ct, Ct+1), t = 1, 2, 3, 4, equals 0.3.
Cash Flow Distribution Expected NPV and r. h. s. of (13)
t αmin αmod αmax E(Ct) LBt E(Vt) γ(ε∗)E(Vt) E(V −t )
1 6000 18000 27000 17 000.00 -44 545.45 -34 545.45 -34.62 34 568.25
2 7666.67 23000 34500 21 722.22 -38 209.37 -16 593.20 -16.63 16 637.35
3 9666.67 29000 42500 27 388.89 -30 946.66 3 984.47 3.99 2 155.23
4 8333.33 25000 37500 23 611.11 -25 254.88 20 111.18 20.15 131.41
5 6333.33 19000 28500 17 944.44 -21 322.38 31 253.27 31.32 6.99
Table 6: Parameter values of triangular cash flow distributions, lower bound and
mean of NPV, right hand side of (13), and simulation results for expected loss
Let the actual useful life of the investment project be five years. The correspond-
ing expected loss then turns out to be 6.99 which is below the critical upper bound of
31.32. Consequently, the risky project dominates the risk-free one in terms of ASD
at the given level of ε∗ = 0.001. Note that when carrying out the simulation exper-
iment with the same initial seed for the random number generator we observed an
expected loss of 1.15 for pairwise uncorrelated cash flow variables, while it increased
to 29.59 for a correlation equal to 0.6.
4.3 An interpretation of (13) as a generalization of the pay-
back criterion
While the Leshno-Levy criterion (13) is easily applied in a simulation context, it
does not provide much insight into the underlying economic mechanism. Hence, we
specify the risky investment in greater detail to gain additional insight. The first
assumption enables us to derive a simple and intuitive upper bound for the expected
loss, E(V −), of the risky investment project.62 The following interpretations of (13)
will build upon this upper bound.
1. Assumption: Convexity of CDF G(·) on [LB, 0]
62Ogryczak/Ruszczynski (1999) yield an alternative upper bound. They discuss absolute semide-
viation δ = 0.5
∫ −∞
∞ |v − E(V )|G(dv) as a measure of risk. From their Corollary 2 follows
E(V −) ≤ δ. Therefore it is easy to derive a mean-risk criterion from the Leshno-Levy criterion
(13) which ensures ε∗-ASD of the risky project: 0 ≤ E(V )− γ(ε∗)−1δ ⇒ G(·) ε∗ H(·).
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Assume that the net present value, V , is a continuous random variable with CDF
G(·). If moreover CDF G(·) is convex on [LB, 0] we get the following upper bound
E(V −) = P (V ≤ 0)E(−V |V ≤ 0) ≤ 1
2
|LB|G(0) (15)
This upper bound is determined by the probability that the NPV is non-positive,
G(0) = P (V ≤ 0), i.e., a kind of loss probability, and the maximal potential loss in
wealth, LB.63 Thus, 1
2
|LB| serves as an upper bound for E(−V |V ≤ 0).
Whether or not (15) holds is easily checked by evaluating the corresponding
simulation results. For instance, the Monte-Carlo simulation considered above yields
a G(0) of 0, 00224851. With LB taken from table 6 we calculate the upper bound to
be 1
2
|LB|G(0) = 23.97. Since for the example the expected loss amounts to 6.99, see
table 6 again, (15) holds. Note that the quality of the upper bound for the expected
loss crucially depends on the characteristics of G(·) in the negative part. Especially,
if G(·) is rather flat, but shows a significant probability of very small losses, the
upper bound of (15) poorly approximates the true E(V −).
2. Assumption: Non-negative cash flows
Condition (15) becomes even simpler, if all future cash flows are non-negative, i.e.,
ct = 0 for all periods t ≥ 1. This assumption seems to be restrictive only at
first glance.64 Remember that Ct is the net cash flow originating from the risky
project in period t. Hence, a straightforward interpretation of this assumption is
that management anticipating a negative net cash flow in the future will discontinue
project operations.
With the simplifying assumption ct = 0 for all periods t ≥ 1 and the amount of
capital originally tied up in the investment project denoted by I = |C0|, obviously
|LB| = I. First, we thus conclude from the Leshno-Levy criterion (13) and the
upper bound (15) the following.
Corollary 1 Under assumptions 1. and 2.,
1
2
G(0)I ≤
[
1
1
ε∗ − 2
]
E(V ) = γ(ε∗)E(V ) (16)
63Remember P (V < 0) = P (V ≤ 0) for continuous random variables V .
64A sensible application of the payback criterion under uncertainty relies on the implicit as-
sumption of non-negative cash flows beyond the cut-off date. Hence, the empirically observable
use of the payback method indicates that such investment projects satisfying the assumption of
non-negative cash flows in the long run are rather common.
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is a sufficient condition for the risky investment project to dominate the risk-free
alternative by ε∗-ASD, G(·) ε∗ H(·).
Formula (16) is a generalization of the simple dynamic version of the payback cri-
terion, a fact we will focus on in this section. Further, we will emphasize in section
4.4 that it can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted rate of return as well.
Second, non-negative cash flows allow an interpretation of (13) in terms of the
dynamic payback criterion’s deterministic version. This dynamic payback criterion
inspects periods 1 ≤ t ≤ T to see whether or not the discounted cumulated cash
flows realized hitherto exceed the initial capital outlay I. The payback period is
the first period when no capital remains tied up in the project. In order to extend
this procedure to the current situation, we define the time-dependent random net
present values Vt, t = 1, ..., T, analogously to the definition of NPV, V , in (8)
Vt =
t∑
τ=0
q−τCτ (17)
The CDF Gt(·) of random variable Vt lives the on finite support [LBt, UBt], with
the lower bound LBt = C0 + q−1c1 + ... + q−tct and the upper bound UBt = C0 +
q−1c1 + ... + q−tct. Figure 3 shows the CDFs of the time-dependent random NPVs
V1, V2, ..., V5 based on the Monte-Carlo simulation described in the example of section
4.2 for the case of stochastic independent cash flows.
Distribution for NPV
0
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Figure 3: CDFs of NPVs V1, V2, ..., V5, from left to right.
To proceed with the payback interpretation of (13) for a given fixed value for ε∗,
see figure 4. The straight line in figure 4 starting at the origin is the set of all those
combinations (y, z) of expected loss in wealth, y ≥ 0, and expected NPV, z ≥ 0, for
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Figure 4: Graphical representation of admissible solutions
which (13) holds with equality, y = γ(ε∗)z. If the risky investment project dominates
the risk-free alternative in terms of ε∗-ASD, the combination
(
E(V −T ), E(VT )
)
is an
element of the set of feasible solutions of (13), indicated in figure 4 by the hatched
area.
Suppose now that, following the payback procedure,
(
E(V −t ), E(Vt)
)
, t = 0, 1,
..., T , are calculated successively. Then, the initial combination
(
E(V −0 ), E(V0)
)
is
not an element of that set of admissible solutions because E(V0) = C0 < 0. Hence,
a period t∗, 1 ≤ t∗ ≤ T exists, when (13) holds for the first time. Combinations
calculated for later periods,
(
E(V −t∗+n), E(Vt∗+n)
)
, n = 1, 2, ..., T − t∗, may in general
leave the set of feasible solutions again. However, for non-negative cash flows Ct, t >
t∗, this is ruled out, because in this case E(V −t+1) ≤ E(V −t ) and E(Vt) ≤ E(Vt+1).
Thus, t∗ reminds of the payback period: All decision makers represented by U (ε∗)
prefer the risky investment project to the risk-free investment, if the former’s useful
life exceeds t∗, i.e., t∗ ≤ T .
For example, the simulation results displayed in table 6 show that
(
E(V −t ), E(Vt)
)
are not elements of the set of admissible solutions for t = 0, 1, ..., 4, while obviously(
E(V −5 ), E(V5)
)
= (6.99, 31253.27) is. Therefore, t∗ = 5 can be interpreted as a
payback period, if the project’s useful life is sufficiently long.
Hitherto, we only assumed non-negativity of cash flows and the convexity of
CDFs G(·) on [LB, 0]. If we impose on the risky investment project the additional
assumption that expected cash flows are identical, the relationship between the
Leshno-Levy criterion (13) and the payback criterion becomes even more obvious.65
3. Assumption: Random cash flows with identical expected value
65Note that this is a generalization of the original assumption used by Gordon (1955) in his
attempt to justify the payback criterion.
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Assume in the following a zero interest rate for the risk-free investment, i = 0, as the
ordinary static payback criterion does. Further, let expected cash flows be identical,
E(Ct) = cˆ > 0, for all periods t ≥ 1. Under these assumptions the expected NPV
of the risky project is given by E(V ) = T cˆ− I , and (16) becomes
G(0)
2γ(ε∗)
≤ (T cˆ− I)
I
(18)
Inequality (18) means that the risky investment project dominates the risk-free
project by ε∗-ASD, i.e., G(·) ε∗ H(·). Denoting the static project-specific payback
period in the common way by βG = Icˆ and rearranging (18) results in
Corollary 2 Under assumptions 1., 2., and 3.
βG ≤ T1
2
(
1
ε∗ − 2
)
G(0) + 1
= β∗ ≤ T (19)
is a sufficient condition for ε∗-ASD dominance of the risky investment project,
G(·) ε∗ H(·).66
In (19) β∗ is the cut-off value which the project-specific payback period βG should
not exceed. If the common static payback period βG is not greater than β∗, the
risky investment project is the ε∗-dominant alternative. Thus, (19) reflects the way
the common payback criterion is used as a restriction in capital budgeting processes,
see section 3: If the payback period βG is small enough relative to the cut-off value,
then the scrutinized risky investment project is acceptable. ε∗-almost stochastic
dominance as a tool for modeling certain aspects of organizational structures of the
company in the way described in this paper, therefore, may conceptually explain
the use of the payback criterion in many real-world capital budgeting processes.
Expectedly, the cut-off period β∗ depends on the risk parameter ε∗ that rep-
resents the decision makers attitude toward risk. Further, it is a function of the
project specific useful life T and the probability of eventually suffering a loss,
G(0) = P (V < 0), too.67 The smaller ε∗, i.e., the more risk averse the relevant
decision makers are, and the greater the loss probability as a parameter measuring
66Note that this Corollary is easily modified to cover the alternative scenario used by Levy (1968)
in his analysis of the payback criterion. Moreover, we can adjust for the case of non-identical but
positive expected cash flows.
67That the cut-off period should depend on the risk of the project under scrutiny is well known
in the literature, cf. Horngreen et al. (2006, p. 731).
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the project’s inherent risk, the more restrictive is the cut-off value for a given useful
life. The longer, c. p., the useful life, the weaker is the requirement given by (19).68
4.4 An interpretation of (13) as a generalization of a rate of
return criterion
For this interpretation, assume again that the CDF, G(·), of the final NPV, V , is
continuous on its finite support, convex on [LB, 0], and that cash flows are non-
negative. Hence, condition (16) is applicable to show the risky investment project’s
ε∗-ASD. Rearranging this condition yields the following
Corollary 3 Under assumptions 1. and 2.
ρˆ =
G(0)
2γ(ε∗)
≤ E(V )
I
= ρG (20)
is a sufficient condition for ε∗-ASD dominance of the risky investment project,
G(·) ε∗ H(·).
E(V ) > 0 is the expected net present value representing the increase in wealth
resulting from the risky investment project. Since the net present value of the risk
free investment project is by definition zero, ρG may be interpreted as a multi-period
risk premium, defined for T periods. Hence, the risky investment project dominates
the risk-free one in terms of ε∗-ASD, if the project’s multi-period risk premium
exceeds the cut-off value ρˆ.69 Phrased differently, the decision makers demand a
compensation of at least ρˆI for the risk they take. While the expected NPV is
commonly calculated as
E(V ) =
T∑
τ=0
q−τE(Cτ ) = −I +
T∑
τ=1
q−τE(Cτ ) (21)
the risky project is dominant by ε∗-ASD if according to (20)
0 ≤ −ρˆI + E(V ) = −(1 + ρˆ)I +
T∑
τ=1
q−τE(Cτ ) (22)
68For example, if the useful life of an investment project is T = 10 years and the probability
of a loss in wealth is G(0) = 0.2, the board determining the cut-off payback period to be 3 years
implies that ε∗ = 0.04, i.e., the set of all relevant decision makers, D, is a subset of U(0.04).
69This cut-off value is transformed into a required markup to the interest rate soon.
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This means, the decision makers expect the project to generate (expected and dis-
counted) cash flows which cover not only the initial capital outlay, I, but also the
multi-period risk compensation, ρˆI. Note that the critical value, ρˆ, and thus the
compensation, depend on the project’s risk in terms of the probability of a loss in
wealth, G(0), and parameter γ(ε∗), representing the risk attitude of the decision
makers.
Inequality (20) provides a key to delegating at least part of the investment de-
cision process to lower management levels. Once parameter γ(ε∗) is determined
for the investment committee, other managers may collect and analyze project-
data and subsequently calculate the loss probability, the expected net present value
E(V ), and the initial capital outlay I. Finally, they can compute the project-specific
multi-period risk premium ρG and compare it to the specific cut-off risk premium ρˆ
derived from (20). If the cut-off premium is exceeded, the risky investment project
is preferable to the risk-free alternative from the investment committee’s point of
view.
Example: Table 7 depicts the values of parameter ε∗ computed from (20) for
different values of the specific cut-off rate ρˆ and the probability of a loss in wealth
G(0). As an example suppose that the relevant decision makers expect a multi-
period risk premium of 0.12 and the probability of suffering a loss in wealth is
0.10. Thus, all decision makers in U(0.227) prefer the risky investment project to
the risk-free one. If at least one relevant decision maker was more risk averse, i.e.,
the corresponding ε∗ was smaller than 0.227, the risk premium would have to be
increased accordingly.
cut-off risk premium ρˆ
G(0) 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.001 0.00495 0.00450 0.00413 0.00382 0.00355 0.00331 0.00249 0.00199
0.01 0.04545 0.04167 0.03846 0.03571 0.03333 0.03125 0.02381 0.01923
0.05 0.16667 0.15625 0.14706 0.13889 0.13158 0.12500 0.10000 0.08333
0.1 0.25000 0.23810 0.22727 0.21739 0.20833 0.20000 0.16667 0.14286
0.2 0.33333 0.32258 0.31250 0.30303 0.29412 0.28571 0.25000 0.22222
0.3 0.37500 0.36585 0.35714 0.34884 0.34091 0.33333 0.30000 0.27273
Table 7: ε∗ for given critical value and loss probability G(0)
Table 7 can also be read in another way. From Table 4 we know that in the example
of exponential utility functions all seven decision makers are included in U(ε∗) for
29
ε∗ = 0.332. Thus, if the loss probability is estimated at G(0) = 0.3, a multi-period
risk premium above 0.15 is required by the investment committee, given almost
stochastic dominance is used as the basis for the final decision.
As stated above the critical risk premium, ρˆ, is a multi-period rate, i.e., it is not
an interest rate for a single period but for the project’s whole useful life. In order
to emphasize the appropriate interpretation of this multi-period risk premium, it
will be transformed into an annual rate. Equating the right hand side of (22) to
zero yields the project’s risk-adjusted internal rate of return, iˆ, that accounts for
the compensation of project risk. Consequently, the risky project is preferred to the
risk-free one by ε∗-ASD, if this risk-adjusted IRR exceeds the risk-free investment’s
interest rate i, iˆ ≥ i,.
Calculating the risk-adjusted IRR of a project with identical expected cash flows,
E(Ct) = cˆ for all t ≥ 1, is particularly simple, as in this case (22) reduces to70
0 = −(1 + ρˆ)I + α(ˆi, T )cˆ, (23)
Note that we get
α(ˆi, T ) = (1 + ρˆ)α(i∗, T ) (24)
from (23), if i∗ is the common IRR of the investment project calculated from equating
(21) to zero, i.e., ignoring the demanded risk compensation, for identical expected
cash flows cˆ
0 = −I + α(i∗, T )cˆ (25)
Example: For a given cut-off risk-premium of ρˆ = 0.12, a useful life of T = 6 and
a common IRR of i∗ = 0.15, we derive from (24)
α(ˆi, 6) = 1.12α(0.15, 6) = 4, 238620617 (26)
or a risk-adjusted IRR iˆ = 0.10934. Hence, this per annum IRR is about 0.04
smaller than the common IRR of i∗ = 0.15. Put differently, this means that instead
of levying a risk compensation of ρˆI the interest rate of the risk-free investment, i,
could be increased by 0.04 to yield the appropriate cut-off value for the common
IRR.71
70α(i, T ) = (1+i)
T−1
(1+i)T i
denotes the annuity factor for T periods and interest rate i.
71Note that Pike (1984, p. 344) empirically estimates the risk premium added to the risk-free
interest rate between 7% and 16% for typical-risk investment projects.
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5 Summary and conclusions
Initiated by the payback criterion’s prominence in business practice the following
research questions have been raised:
1. In the analytical literature on capital budgeting the organizational embedding
of investment decision processes has been neglected hitherto. If taken into
account, can it contribute to explaining the widespread use of key investment
figures, like, e.g., payback periods or hurdle rates defined on profitability?
2. How may investment decisions within a multi-person context be represented
from a decision theoretical perspective? Does almost stochastic dominance
provide a suitable modeling device?
3. The information required for communicating risk attitudes via ASD is less
extensive compared to that under an EUT regime. Can this fact contribute
to the explanation of the payback criterion’s popularity in business practice?
Following the review of a large body of empirical papers in section 2 which empha-
size the high relevance of the problem at hand, we develop in section 3 a framework
of representative organizational environments of investment decision processes. In
contrast to most contributions analyzing the use of key figures in capital budget-
ing like, e.g., the payback period, we allow for these organizational aspects to play
an important role in decision making. On the one hand, we account for the fact
that investment responsibility is typically delegated to a group of individuals. Such
groups need to agree on the merits of a risky investment project as compared to
a risk free investment, demanding descriptions of risk attitudes which can be eas-
ily discussed and compared. On the other hand, we take into consideration that
preparation of proposals, pre-selection of projects, and decision making are (partly)
delegated to lower-level management. Hence, it is a requirement that descriptions
of risk attitudes can be easily communicated.
Having derived the importance of the investment decisions’ organizational em-
bedding, we introduce in section 4.1 the concept of almost stochastic dominance
for describing the risk attitudes of the relevant decision makers. From a theoret-
ical perspective, a risky investment project’s profitability is best described by its
stochastic net present value. But even if the corresponding distribution function
was given and known by all decision makers, the corresponding risk might individu-
ally be perceived in different ways due to varying utility functions. This complicates
the modeling of capital budgeting decisions in a multi-person context. However, as
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demonstrated in section 4.2 of this paper, ε-ASD may be extended to represent the
risk preferences of a specific group of decision makers characterized by the parame-
ter value ε∗. Thus, the participation of a multitude of decision makers is accounted
for in a natural way: ε∗-ASD of a risky investment project over the risk-free alter-
native means that all relevant decision makers prefer the first project. We show
under very general assumptions that this ε∗-ASD is equivalent to a criterion that
balances the risky project’s expected loss with its expected NPV, weighted by a
factor that depends on the decision makers’ attitudes toward risk. This criterion
is very easily applied to real-world investment projects using simple spread sheet
simulation as demonstrated in section 4.2. Note moreover, that determining ε∗ as
the parameter describing the decision makers’ risk attitudes might be easier than
estimating von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions from a decision analytical
point of view.
The simplification of information processing activities inherent to this approach
becomes evident, when, an application of the Leshno-Levy criterion or the even
simpler payback criterion as stated in Corollary 2 is compared to decision making
based on Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in a decentralized firm. Consider a group
of decision makers in charge of the capital budgeting decision which wants to delegate
preparatory tasks, like, e.g., the pre-selection of viable projects, or the final decision
on ‘small projects‘, to the lower ranks of the management hierarchy. Following EUT,
the set of individual utility functions representing the relevant decision makers would
have to be communicated to those managers responsible for the preparatory stages
of the decision making process or selecting ’small’ investment projects. In contrast,
the use of the ASD payback criterion is fairly simple and secures acceptability from
all committee members’ point of view. By means of this tool risk preferences are
simply conveyed and delegating project selection to lower-level management is easily
controlled. Hence, the number of pieces of information to be exchanged is reduced
significantly. Instead of communicating a set of utility functions respectively the
probability distribution of the NPV only the cut-off value, β∗, or the project specific
payback period, βG, is transmitted.
The more detailed analysis in section 4.3 shows our criterion to be a generaliza-
tion of the common payback criterion. Similar considerations apply to the criterion’s
interpretation as a risk-adjusted internal rate of return in section 4.4. Developing
criteria from almost stochastic dominance which coincide with simple key indica-
tors contributes to explaining the payback criterion’s prominence. The reason is
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that these criteria allow to identify the investment alternative preferable by a group
of relevant decision makers and simplify communication of risk preferences as well
as project characteristics.Since they are derived under fairly general organizational
circumstances these criteria are applicable to real-life capital budgeting processes.
Moreover, formulae for calculating cut-off values of these key indicators like in Corol-
lary 2 may support reasonable decision making. Under the corresponding assump-
tions decisions based on these criteria turn out be rational in terms of decision theory.
Further, these criteria permit identifying investment projects which are commonly
acceptable in terms of risk, even at the initial stages of the appraisal process. Thus,
they provide reasonable instruments to reduce the burden resting on final decision
making bodies with respect to routinely approved projects.
Note that our analysis focuses solely on simple investment appraisals, i.e., the
choice between a risky investment project and a risk-free alternative. This is no lim-
itation for the majority of ‘small investment projects’ involving decision-delegation
to lower and middle management. Here, restrictions on liquidity are of minor in-
terest, meaning the projects will be assessed based exclusively on their individual
merits. Considerations will be different for ‘large investment projects’ challenging
a company’s financial resources. Here, with two or more projects competing for
liquidity, the choice will be between different risky investment projects. In this case,
the role of the payback criterion may be that of a necessary condition, meaning the
criterion has to be met by the project for being considered as a reasonable alterna-
tive. Moreover, for projects of this importance a formal investment proposal should
be required. Here, the payback criterion may serve as one important indicator,
but the final decision will depend on a number of additional aspects, like strategic,
managerial, technological or others.
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A Additional evidence on PB’s prominence
Recent data from a European survey study are presented in Table 8:72
GER FRA NL UK
NPV 47.6% 35.1% 70.0% 47.0%
IRR 42.2% 44.1% 56.0% 53.1%
PB 50.0% 50.9% 64.7% 69.2%
Table 8: Capital budgeting in Europe
Further, additional American surveys are given in Table 9:
Gitman Schall Kim Cooper Graham/
et al. (1977) et al. (1978) et al. (1990) et al. (1992) Harvey (2001)
NPV 36% 56% 45% 46% 75%
IRR 68% 65% 64% 85% 76%
PB 53% 74% 54% 58% 57%
Table 9: Capital budgeting in the US
B Facts and definitions
For reading convenience we put together the following definition and facts
(D1) For y, y ∈ R, y < y, the set U(ε; y) of twice differentiable, non-satiable, and
real valued utility functions is defined by
U(ε; y) =
{
u ∈ U : u′(y) ≤
[
1
ε
− 1
]
min
{
u′(z) : z ∈ [y, y]} , y ∈ [y, y]
}
(F1) U(ε; y) ⊂ U for all 0 < ε ≤ 1/2
(F2) ε1 < ε2 ⇒ U(ε2; y) ⊂ U(ε1; y); see Leshno/Levy (2002, p. 1079)
(F3) Let M ⊂ R be an interval and [y, y] ⊂ M . For twice differentiable utility
functions on M the defining inequality in (D1) may be reformulated:
72DeBrounen et al. (2004, p. 7).
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max
{
u′(z) : z ∈ [y, y]} ≤
[
1
ε
− 1
]
min
{
u′(z) : z ∈ [y, y]}
⇔ ε ≤
[
1 +
max{u′(z)}
min{u′(z)}
]−1
=: eu ∈
(
0,
1
2
]
where ε = 0.5 iff the utility function is linear. Let D ⊂ U be the finite set of utility
functions representing the relevant decision makers. To avoid a situation where the
evaluation of the risky project based on expected values is sufficient, exclude the
case of only risk neutral decision makers. Note that for risk neutral utility functions
the bound defined in (F3) becomes eu = 1/2. Further, let E(D; y) denote the set of
parameter values ε with D ⊆ U(ε; y):
E(D; y) = {ε : 0 < ε < 1/2, D ⊆ U(ε; y)} (27)
Lemma 1 E(D; y) is a non-empty set and bounded from above by eˆ < 1
2
.
Proof: Let [εn, n ∈ N], 0 < εn < 1/2, be a sequence of numbers with limn→∞ εn =
0. Due to (F2) [U(εn; y), n ∈ N] is a non-decreasing sequence of sets. Now let
eˆ = min{eu : u ∈ D} be the smallest of the bounds defined in (F3) for any utility
function in the set D. 0 < eˆ < 1/2 holds true because there is at least one non-
linear utility function in D. Hence, there is an neˆ ∈ N so that for all n ≥ neˆ we
have εn < eˆ. For all these εn, due to (F3), D ⊆ U(εn; y) . Thus from definition (27)
follows that E(D; y) is non-empty. Moreover, E(D; y) is bounded by 0 and eˆ < 1/2.
Hence, sup E(D; y) < 1
2
exists. Consequently, define the largest ε, so that the set
U(ε; y) contains the utility function of all relevant decision makers, i.e. ε∗y, by
ε∗y := sup E(D; y) (28)
With this definition we get the following result for intervals [v < v] ⊂ [x < x]
discussed in section 4.1
Proposition 2 For [v < v] ⊂ [x < x] define ε∗x and ε∗v by (28). Then ε∗x ≤ ε∗v.
Proof: Definitions (28) and (D1) yield D ⊆ U(ε∗x;x) ⊂ U(ε∗x; v). Hence, ε∗x ∈
E(D; v) and, therefore, ε∗x ≤ sup E(D; v) = ε∗v.
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